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Suicide Tactics
(See page 120, February 1959 Proceedings)
Captain Dwight M. Bradford Williams, usnr (ret.)—In his review of the Naval Institute book, The Divine Wind, Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, Admiral Ekstrom states: “The kamikaze concept as a planned tactic cannot be accepted as a sound one, particularly by Western standards.” (Italics supplied.) Although the suicide concept is unsound from many aspects, this commentator strongly doubts whether the Red Chinese and Russians “have the word” on this. What about Oriental standards?
Suicide tactics have been employed for centuries by Chinese, Russians, and Japanese.
The Japanese human bullets at Port Arthur in 1904 were ground forces. Admiral Oh- nishi’s World War II human bullets or kamikazes were airborne. Vice Admiral Ito’s human bullets in the battleship Yamato were seaborne. The difference in deployment is academic, for, linked with contemporary technology, suicide tactics involving only a handful of dedicated people could sound the death knell of a nation.
The merit of The Divine Wind derives from an awareness which the book transmits graphically to the reader of the potential employment of suicide tactics in future wars. Servicemen and civilians should carefully examine this thought.
In 1237, when the Mongol horde destroyed fourteen Russian cities in one month—including Moscow—no divine wind blew to impede the Tatar conquest. But on 8 September 1380, a Russian army employed suicide tactics to rout the Tatars near the River Don. Human breastworks of Russian soldiers, deployed in a hollow square, were sacrificed in a desperate attempt to stem the advance of the Mongol horsemen. Thousands were killed by the hooves of Tatar horses. But thousands more willingly piled their bodies atop their mangled comrades. Although the Tatars again burned Moscow, suicidal tactics of Dimitri Donskoi’s determined army were not lost to later Russian military commanders.
In 1945, while discussing Russian tactics with Marshal Zhukov, General Eisenhower inquired how the Soviets cleared German minefields. Zhukov impassively explained that the Soviet method of clearing fields of anti-personnel mines was simple—-just order full infantry formations across them. What matter if a battalion or even a regiment literally committed suicide, if such mass sacrifice made it possible for succeeding formations to proceed in safety? German General Haider noted in his diary, Campaign in Russia: “Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapons support; the men commence hurrahing from afar. (Tantamount to the Japanese “banzai” suicide charges.) Incredibly high Russian losses.” Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar has added: “It was a characteristic feature of Russian tactics to keep on attacking without any recognizable change of procedure. Doubtless, their great and bloody losses were due primarily to this (suicidal) method of combat.”
The average Russian soldier knows or cares little about the Communist Party governing Russia. But he believes implicitly his government’s repeated statements that the United States is preparing to conquer his Mother Russia. If Soviet propaganda makes him even think that his land is endangered, he’ll readily fight and, this commentator believes, volunteer for suicide missions. “Mother Russia” is not merely a phrase or cliche—it is tantamount to the Japanese deep reverence for their Emperor.
The classical Russian disregard for human lives and demonstrated amenability to suicide tactics raises some questions. Are we considering the import of human-guided missiles such as the kamikazes were? Are we concentrating our electronics counter-measures against fixed- trajectory missiles such as the ICBM? How effective would our ECM, infra-red, and other gear prove against submarine-launched, short-range, human-guided missiles?
And what about Red China? Mao Tse-tung is ruthlessly exterminating all vestiges of the Confucian family-worship religion. His avowed aim is to implement “complete and absolute Communism”—an endeavor which even Stalin or Khrushchev would hardly attempt. This is not a paradox; history abundantly illustrates that the Chinese are not basically religious in accordance with our Western definition. Rather, they will adopt any religion as an expedient. That the majority has accepted Communism is fact. Communism offers them “freedom to obey.” It provides its adherents with a euphoria of collective success. We must face the fact that, albeit anathema to the Western mind, this distorted philosophy is agreeable to millions.
History has repeatedly indicated that “mass rages” are the norm among Chinese. Chinese (and Soviet) Communist elites can utilize such mass rages, i.e., by equating “natural” behavior with power. If they could control such mass rage epidemics, they should have an inordinately potent weapon.
The Soviet Union could employ this unorthodox force strategically by instigating a proxy war between the United States and Red China, so contrived that our allies would consider intervention hardly justifiable. Matsu and Quemoy provide the most recent example of an attempt along this line. One has but to recall the Russian-German non-aggression pact of 1939. Too many still believe Russia desired that arrangement simply to gain time in which to strengthen her defenses. On the contrary, the USSR hoped that Germany, England, and France should mutually destroy themselves, leaving Russia to exercise uncontested hegemony over Europe. Although too many Americans have completely forgotten the Korean War, the Red Chinese have not. And Formosa remains a pregnant issue for igniting future Russian-sponsored Chinese mass rages.
Question: Will such cyclic irrational outbursts be utilized for triggering Red Chinese mass or individual suicide tacdcs through the medium of human-guided missiles launched from Soviet-built submarines?
On 1 February 1942 a kamikaze plane crashed into USS Enterprise. Prior to that moment, American defense planners had given virtually no thought to suicide tactics. Such fantastic measures would have been deemed wholly unsound—by Western standards, that is.
Not until December 1944—when naval casualties from kamikazes at Leyte Gulf and Ormoc forced the issue—did we accord concerted thought to kamikaze counter-measures. Then, a special electronics section was activated by CNO. Scientific brains from MIT’s Radiation Laboratory and Johns Hopkins University concentrated on this now vital problem. Recommendations from combat officers were belatedly implemented and, through crash programs, we fitted destroyers and destroyer escorts as radar pickets. But the price we paid for non-recognition of Oriental standards was far too high. Of even greater import, we must never forget that we had time in which to prepare—a luxury we should certainly be denied if future panic buttons were pressed!
At V-J Day, more than four thousand Japanese naval aviators—including a vice admiral and a rear admiral—had perished as kamikazes. Admittedly their belatedly implemented mass suicide tactics failed to bring ultimate victory to their nation. On the other side of the ledger, what had their “unsound” suicide tactics cost our Navy? Those dedicated kamikazes sank 34 and damaged 288 American warships. Virtually unknown is the fact that at Okinawa, Navy casualties at sea greatly exceeded the combined casualties of our Army and Marines ashore. Approximately 98 per cent of those seagoing Okinawa casualties were attributable to hits by kamikazes.
Are we aware of the enormous casualties and material damage that could be effected by only five Russian or Red Chinese kamikazes, riding and guiding only five hydrogen missiles, launched from iust five (or fewer) submarines? Missile-riding will soon become fact.
In a recent article, Rear Admiral James Thatch has deplored American apathy toward our Navy’s almost insuperable antisubmarine warfare difficulties. With the addition of still another factor—potential suicide tactics—even the latest digital computer might bilge this problem. But we must apprehend this supervenient factor now— because our opposite numbers conduct their war-planning by Oriental standards.
"Navigation With Earmuffs”
(Sec page 137, May, 1960 Proceedings)
Matt Hensley, Koloa, Kauai, T.H.— Mr. Robert P. Cort brings up a good point when he recognizes the unreliability of faintly- heard whistle signals of passing ships in heavy weather. He further notes that “it is high time modern science tackled this problem.”
In this connection, scientists had the equipment as far back as 1942 which rendered whistle signals as obsolete as the battle equipment of Richard the Lion-Hearted. The problem was, and is, to get the merchant marine to install radar, and, what is more to the point, find some method of teaching the afterguard how to use it.
To begin with, the officers concerned must be familiar enough with the gear to have confidence in it. Most of us can remember several instances where radio direction-finder bearings were disregarded (because the man with the deck had no confidence in them) with disastrous consequences. Radar and its associated gear has had to undergo similar lack of confidence—usually inspired through lack of thorough training in its use.
For almost two decades radar equipment has been available which can give the bearing and distance of any vessels in the vicinity, track them continuously, and warn the deck officer of impending collision. Associated equipment can be combined with it, such as radar beacons, radiophones, tape recorders, etc., that can transmit automatically in any language the name of the ship, and any other pertinent information. More important, a simple switch on the radar beacon can alter the type of “blip” to show the evasive action that is being taken by the ship in question; that is, whether the engines are stopped, going ahead or astern, and whether the helm is being shifted to port or starboard.
As for keeping a lookout outside when the ship is “buttoned up,” he can be replaced by weatherproof microphones in as many places as needed, with the audio-amplifier circuits on the bridge or wheelhouse. Science has long been in a position to provide better ears than those naturally available to any man on the lookout watch. We cannot shift the blame to science in these matters. Science is so far ahead of us in the field of safety equipment that (at our present rate) we will be another two decades in catching up with it.
Our main difficulty is lack of incentive on the part of owners to install equipment available. The next bottleneck is educating the deck officers to the point where they have confidence in gear because they thoroughly understand it. Until then we will probably continue to listen for whistles in periods of low visibility, even after the fire room has been converted to atomic fuel.
Captain Girvin B. Wait, S.S. Korean Rear.—Mr. Robert P. Cort’s discussion on the audibility of whistle signals for passing vessels is very apt. I am master of a high speed Mariner vessel on which an understanding and agreement must be reached early in a passing or crossing situation. In these critical conditions, one is continually placed in a position of not being able either to hear or understand the passing signal of an approaching vessel.
On a modern fast vessel this inability to hear fog or passing signals is due to a number of causes, such as, the wind against the house, bow waves, noise of the main engine and auxiliaries, blowers for the ventilating system and, to some extent, the smaller devices on the bridge. With the combination of the above conditions, personnel without earmuffs and concentrating on a crossing situation, the whistle signal of an approaching vessel is occasionally not heard or else mistaken.
An electronic system for magnifying and giving the bearing of an airborne signal, or the Maritime Administration’s suggestion of an underwater signaling system might be the answer. I have another idea, however, which might have some merit. It is that a small radio transmitter be synchronized with the whistle and steam plume, which, when operated, would trip a relay on the bridge of an approaching vessel; this relay would activate a buzzer, simulating the sound of a steam whistle. The above device is relatively inexpensive, could be trained to pick up only signals from forward of the beam. With this device, the passing signal from an approaching vessel would be heard and then a watch kept for the steam plume.
Reservicing Spotting Planes Underway During World War II
Walter Kussart, Sheboygan, Wisconsin. —During the pre-invasion bombardments of Saipan, Guam, I wo Jima, and Okinawa some observant individual must have wondered how the spotting planes of the bombardment ships could keep flying and spotting long after their gasoline supply should have been used up. It was apparent that the battleships and cruisers were not, as a rule, pulling out of the firing line to recover and reservice their planes.
The answer to this phenomenon had its beginning in Gavuto Harbor, Florida Island, on 8 May 1944, when Commander Group Three, Fifth Amphibious Force ordered USS Williamson (DD-244) alongside USS Prometheus for reconversion from a carrier escort vessel to a destroyer-type seaplane tender.
Williamson was a 1920 four-piper which had been converted into a destroyer-type seaplane tender in 1938. This conversion included the removal of number one and two boilers and installing in their place a 30,000 gallon gasoline tank and also aviation officers quarters. In 1942, after a near fatal mishap, she was converted into a carrier escort vessel because of the need for qualified escort vessels for carriers during flight training exercises. Her major changes at this time were the removal of seaplane tending equipment and the installation of additional armament. The gasoline tank was converted to carry diesel oil. Nobody seems to know why, except for fuel for the whaleboat and gig, but 30,000 gallons is a lot of oil for two boats.
On 8 May 1944 her third and final conversion began, this time to equip her to handle and reservice VO-VSO seaplanes underway. The gasoline tank again was adapted for its original purpose of carrying gasoline, a forty-foot boat was lashed down amidships aft and a boom installed to handle her, and necessary equipment provided to handle a cast recovery net. To compensate for this additional topside weight, removal of the
VALUABLE 1944 FUELING INNOVATION
four single depth charge throwers and storage racks, and one 20 MM machine gun.
With the aid of temporarily assigned aviation personnel, Williamson was ready to try this new method of refueling on 22 May in Purvis Bay. The “guinea pigs” for the operation were planes from Cruiser Division Nine and Battleship Division Three.
The reservicing of the spotting planes involved the streaming of a cruiser-type cast recovery net astern of the ship through a fair- lead on a boom over the starboard propeller guard. A four-inch towline was led forward through fair-leads to a winch amidships. The boom was a three and one-half inch pipe, ten feet long and set at a forty-five degree angle over the propeller guard and supported by two braces mounted on the outer edge of the guard. A breast line of two-inch manila with a large ring over the line, acting as a traveling lizard, was run through the stern chock. A twenty-five foot rubber pneumatic rearming barge was towed astern by a three-inch manila line. The line was secured to the barge with a bridle which was parcelled with a piece of canvas. The bridle was secured to the underside of the barge, tending to give it an uplift and more or less preventing water from spilling into the barge. The barge was towed about twenty feet astern of the ship and contained a one and one-half inch gasoline hose led from the gasoline line fitting on the fantail and coiled down in the barge. The hose was fitted with a self-closing nozzle. The barge also had lubricating oil in self-dispensing one-gallon containers, clipped ammunition, gasoline filters, and miscellaneous items which might be needed by the plane. Material was passed between the barge and the plane or the ship by means of light heaving lines. Two men in the barge acted as filling station operators.
With the barge in the water, the recovery net streamed aft of it and the ship traveling at ten knots, the unit was ready to receive planes. Actually the operation was quite simple for the shipboard personnel; but skill was required by the pilot of the plane. After landing astern of the ship, he taxied up onto the net, then applied a little in-rudder to close the barge while being drawn up to it, after which the breast line held the plane in place while servicing.
Upon completion the ship stopped her engines and when she had slowed to about five knots the towline to the net was paid out rapidly, causing the hook on the float of the plane to clear the net. The pilot then applied a little out-rudder and swung clear.
This method proved its worth during subsequent invasions. The only restriction was that wind and sea conditions had to be favorable to allow the spotting plane to land and take off in the open sea. Of course a ship the size of Williamson was able to form a small slick at least long enough for the plane to get on the step.
This method was suggested by Rear Admiral W. L. Ainsworth, usn, then Commander Cruiser Division Nine. However, in later operations Williamson found it feasible to eliminate the barge and draw the plane directly up to the stern of the ship. This simplified the operation and precluded the necessity of men riding a barge, especially valuable in the cooler northern waters. The procedure remained approximately the same, except that the lubricating oil was passed by hose rather than in one-gallon cans. The ship could make ready for reservicing by simply dropping the recovery net into the water and slowing to ten knots.
During the invasion of Saipan, the first invasion where this method was used, sea conditions were not too favorable, and there was perhaps some resistance to the idea, so Williamson had only four refuelings for the entire operation. During the invasion of Guam she did much better, refueling a total of fifty-five aircraft. She also supplied one battleship with 4,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.
At Iwo Jima, Williamson reserviced thirty- five planes and assisted several downed planes, including one PBM. During this invasion the only reservicing mishap occurred. The pilot of the plane did not give any out- rudder after clearing the net and snagged his port wing float, damaging the strut. He was unable to take off again.
At Okinawa, Williamson1 s duties did not involve the reservicing of spotting planes. Her total score for three invasions was ninety-three planes reserviced and assistance to several downed planes.
Obviously Rear Admiral Ainsworth’s idea was well conceived and very practical. Its worth would have been much greater during the early days of the war when capital ships were at a premium and through this method could have been kept longer on the firing line during bombardments.
"Intellect: the Common Ground”
(See pages 78-81, September, 1959 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John W. Fer- rill, usn (ret.).—This contributor several times has meditated on the sentiments expressed so well by Lieutenant Sachs in his article. There is a new intellectual consciousness undergoing renaissance in our Navy today. “The small but influential group who have maintained a continual habit of self education and intellectual improvement” have added many members to this group. As a graduate student at the George Washington University and Georgetown University, this commentator has been pleasantly amazed at the numbers of not only officers of all ranks, but ambitious enlisted men who are taking courses of a non-professional nature to gain further insight into matters of foreign policy, politics, current events, public relations, mass communications, group psychology, etc. Informed sources report this same intellectual renaissance is in progress at many other institutions of higher learning, both in this country and abroad.
This writer disagrees with the modern journalists who claim that military men lack familiarity with the humanities and have little erudition in non-professional matters. The list of retired military men who are on the teaching staffs of our higher institutions is legion. A great many of these people are not teaching truly professional subjects, but those generally considered to be within the purely intellectual sphere (history, languages, government, education, economics, jurisprudence, political science, mathematics, physics, philosophy, etc.).
* * *
Memoirs of Admiral Doenitz
(See pages 114-115, January, 1960 Proceedings)
Allison YV. Saville, Annapolis, Maryland.—Lieutenant Commander Kemp’s review of Ten Tears and Twenty Days raises a series of speculations on Doenitz and his career that require clarification.
First, it is certainly true that Doenitz was an ardent follower of guerre de course theory, contrary to the “big, balanced fleet” theory that his superior, Admiral Raeder, successfully had pushed in the materialization of the “Z Plan” in 1938. But, to his credit, Doenitz was following a philosophy of naval power that Germany had adopted after 1918. Walter Gladisch (later an admiral) had adopted the theory in working up the German naval mobilization plans in 1921, and Admiral Wolfgang Wegener had synthesized this view for the German naval planning staff in 192.9 A member of this staff himself for a time during the twenties, Doenitz very likely simply took up the torch for what was popular, and, in view of the restrictions on the German fleet by international treaty, what was without
alternative. Looking back to the records and writings of the time, there appear to have been not a few takers within the Royal Navy itself that perhaps the German naval guerre de course war with U-boats and raiders had a chance.
Second, when one speaks of the numbers of German U-boats in 1939, the figures of those under construction deserve attention. The Germans did have only 57 U-boats in commission (only 22 of which were capable of ocean operations), but in addition they had another 61 in various stages of construction before war broke out in September, and all were due for completion in 1940. This program was not unknown abroad, yet this doubling of the German U-boat arm within a year called forth no rapid development either of British or French ASW forces and techniques, much to their later great anxiety and regret.
Finally, it seems most unusual that the Grand Admiral made not a single mention of the men or the work that went into the preparations for the resurrection of the L^-boat arm between 1920 and 1935.
"The Red Cross Serves All Hands”
(See pages 79-81, November, 1959 Proceedings)
^BOUNDARY LAYER CONTROL—High-speed air from pylon-mounted turbojet compressors is blown over flaps, ailerons, elevator, and rudder —causing airstream to hug the surfaces instead of being separated. The energization of surface air gives the BLC-130
BOUNDARY LAYER BREAKTHROUGH
50-ton BLC-130 lands on 500-foot lightplane strips
At the turn-around point of a 2,000-mile round trip mission, Lockheed’s new Boundary Layer Control C-130 will roll to a stop in 520 feet after touchdown. Takeoff is just as remarkable: lift-off in 500 feet—from an unprepared field. Stall speed: less than 50 knots.
The BLC-130 is built on a proved and paid-for airframe design. It adds true STOL capability to the other C-130 superiorities established in more than three years of Air Force service: fast loading and unloading; rough- field takeoff and landing; performance of diverse airfreight/airdrop missions at low cost; and direct-to-trouble-spot airlift, such as the recent Congo airlift in which C-130s played the major role.
A test bed BLC-130 has completed flight tests, clearly demonstrating the feasibility of boundary layer control on large airplanes.
Alfred S. Campbell, Annapolis, Md- Based on my wartime experience and later reflection, here are my conclusions on how American Red Cross activities could be improved in case of future armed conflict. Red Cross personnel going out to serve on shipboard or at foreign stations abroad first should be required to take and pass the usual rigid Navy physical examination. Next, they should receive a thorough pre-embarkation briefing by a seasoned naval officer on shipboard procedure and how to correlate their efforts with those of recreation, supply, and medical officers. They should be permitted a free hand in the judicious selection of types and amounts of Red Cross supplies deemed necessary, and furnished by the Red Cross with adequate cash funds. They also should be encouraged to act on their own considered initiative when out of touch with National Headquarters. Finally, at all times they should willingly and cheerfully follow the wishes and policy of the
commanding officer of the ship or station to which they are attached.
Anecdote "Just for Drill”
(See page 135, December, 1959 Proceedings)
Hanns J. Maier, Sao Paulo, Brazil.—By coincidence this incident occurred twice. In Rear Admiral W. S. Chalmers’s Max Horton and the Western Approaches (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1954), on page 165 appeared the following anecdote about Vice Admiral Gilbert Stephenson, 1940 Commander of the Admiralty’s Tobermory training center for corvettes and sloops.
“ . . . another time, while inspecting a Dominion corvette, the Admiral threw his cap on the deck and said: ‘That’s an unexploded bomb. Take action quick.’ Whereupon a young rating broke from the gaping crew and kicked it over the side. Showing no surprise, the Admiral commended the lad on his presence of mind, and pointing to the semisubmerged cap, said ‘That’s a survivor —jump in and save him.’ It was November. . .
"Defense Against Nuclear-Powered Submarines”
(See pages 71—75, December 1959 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert E. May, usn—Commander Weatherup’s article overlooks two vital factors. The advent of the ballistic missile submarine precludes any ASW plan based on a submarine’s being detected by its attack, and the use of nuclear weapons at sea would be more advantageous to our potential enemies than it is to us.
When our Polaris system becomes fully operational, there will be no doubts as to what can be done in the submarine ballistic missile field. We have no choice but to develop an antisubmarine system which will detect, classify, track, and if and when it becomes necessary, destroy ballistic missile submarines. They are indeed fearsome weapons which can accomplish their purpose without exposing themselves to sight, without other detection except with very short range; complicated equipment, and with all the protection International Law can provide.
We would give potential enemies a tremendous advantage if we were to wage war with a
tacit agreement that nuclear weapons would be used only against targets at sea. Without considering the nonuse of them against shore targets, use of nuclear weapons at sea makes the anti-shipping nuclear-powered submarine a balanced weapon. Without nuclear weapons, the nuclear-powered submarine can destroy only a limited number of the shipping targets it is able to approach. With them it can destroy an entire convoy at long range. Not only must the ASW forces survive the explosion, but they must also locate the attacking submarine inside a much larger circle than would be the case otherwise. The effectiveness of nuclear weapons against a highspeed nuclear submarine is to be doubted. Aside from indiscriminate use of them on nonsubmarine targets, there are target prediction or long-range tracking problems which must be solved to protect the ASW craft.
The only way to tackle the nuclear-powered submarine or ballistic missile submarine is to go down after him and hang on until he makes his intentions known. No surface ship today can do this, nor can any aircraft or helicopter. The only way it can be done is with another high-speed ntlclear-powered submarine which can match him, move for move.
"Scapa Flow”
(See pages 76-85, December, 1959 Proceedings)
Commander R. R. Beauchamp, rn (ret.). -—At the surrender of the German fleet in 1919, I stood the forenoon watch in a destroyer of the escorting forces. After the two fleets met, we turned sixteen points and, what with excitement, nervousness, or too much celebration the night before, I made a shocking turn. From Captain D’s yardarm soon fluttered the signal, “Anzac. Maneuver badly executed.” I had let the Navy down and the Empire as well! The Germans, I felt certain, must have noted, with supercilious eye, such a dreadful example of seamanship.
This matter has weighed heavily on my mind for forty years. Recently I read in the Proceedings Admiral Ruge’s account of the German surrender and scuttling. The British fleet, he wrote, was “ready for action, superbly handled.” What balm there is in these words. They had not noticed it after all! I am sleeping much better now.