rofi'
fairly
The United States had no choice in March 1987 but to expand its naval presence in the Persian Gulf from five ships to more than 20. To protect its vital interests in the region, support its Arab allies against the Iranian threat, and keep the Soviet Union’s presence in the Gulf to a minimum, the United States had to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers and begin large-scale convoy protection operations. In spite of this limited room for maneuver, the U. S. Navy’s actions during the convoy operations achieved the stated goals of both protecting the Gulf oil supply line and reaffirming the U. S. commitment to its Arab allies’ security. This has come at a high cost, however: 39 dead American servicemen; two badly damaged frigates; and unplanned, expensive fleet deployments.
While in the long run direct U. S. Navy involvement may prove the only policy that can guarantee Persian Gulf security, the Navy must begin to explore other policy options for future crises in the region. One such alternative to maintaining large U. S. deployments in the Gulf is to develop the naval capabilities of one of its regional allies to assist the U. S. Navy.
The principal advantage of such a plan is a reduction in the number of U. S. naval forces needed to patrol the Gulf and protect freedom of navigation and transit. The development of U. S.-supplied regional naval (and naval air) forces also would lay the foundation for positioning future U. S. naval logistical stores and gaining access to support facilities near the Gulf. This would also increase U. S. cooperation with regional navies and facilitate opening naval bases to U. S. ship visits. From a fiscal viewpoint, this proposal would offer substantial savings because the cost of deploying relatively highly paid U. S. sailors halfway around the world is clearly more than that of supplying weaponry for less expensive indigenous forces. Such aid, if given to a Muslim nation, could increase U. S. esteem among its cautious Arab Gulf allies, specifically Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most importantly, such a plan would help reduce the sometimes inflammatory effect that large-scale U. S. deployments can cause in the Gulf.
First the United States must identify a country suitable for such naval development. The principal U. S. ally in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, has developed a strong air force using U. S. and British arms.1 Unfortunately, Saudi Arabian naval development along these lines has failed because of its exceedingly small base of maritime-oriented, technically competent personnel.2 The other Arab Gulf states have even smaller population bases and cannot even ponder such a naval program. India, the strongest regional naval power and a country in search of advanced naval technology, is not willing to cooperate with the United States to defend U. S. interests in the Gulf. Much to the contrary, India, while championing the cause of non- aligned nations, has sought the removal of superpower navies from the Indian Ocean.3 Because of the U. S. rejection of such a plan, India’s navy has turned principally to the Soviet Union, a supplier that has attached few explicit strings to military assistance.
So to which country can the United States turn? Pakistan may prove to be an extremely compatible maritime partner. Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in
assisting the mujahadeen of Afghanistan and stymie*1^ Soviet expansion and has already received much U. • military assistance this decade. As a result, the infrastruc ture needed for receiving aid is already in place. In acl tion, Pakistan can support such a naval expansion. It large population base (100 million) that has some PrC ciency in English and its higher education system is well-developed.
History of U. S. -Pakistani Relations: Pakistan isstrat^ gically located between India, Afghanistan, and Iran, c’ dering along the Indian Ocean in the heart of Southwe Asia. Its northernmost port city of Quetta is about miles from the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan was create * 1947 as a homeland for the Muslims of British India w desired partition rather than remaining in a unified m dominated by its Hindu majority. Bom amid the Hm Muslim communal strife that claimed more 1 1,000,000 lives following independence, Pakistan su s quently fought three wars with India in 1948, 1965, a 1971. s From its inception, Pakistan turned to the United Sta as its primary source of both economic and military aS ance. In return, Pakistan offered the United States mi • a^ bases and regional defense cooperation in the Cen Treaty Organization (CENTO).4 te
In 1954, under the direction of then-Secretary of John Foster Dulles, the United States undertook to ^ velop a regional defense cooperation against a 8r0, ,,1(j Soviet presence in Asia. Under the terms of the Bag , Pact, the basis of CENTO, Dulles hoped that Pakistan ^ Iran would jointly provide the bulk of “Free World na forces in the region, with the United States maintai ^ only a small Middle East Force naval squadron as its contribution. As U. S. aid packages progressed, *l0'vejran naval assistance and arms sales were extended to alone, and the Pakistani Navy remained neglected. { explanation for this lies not with U. S. policymakers,^ ^ instead with Pakistan, for throughout the initial Perl° t0 U. S. military assistance from 1958 to 1965 it eh0c6- concentrate solely on developing its army and air ^ For seven years the United States helped P3^®*? gast velop one of the strongest armed forces in the Mi®*® ^ and South Asia. Until the Sino-Indian War of 19 United States relied solely on Pakistan for indigenous tributions to South Asian regional defense planning ■ .st. the Pakistanis channeled almost all of the military a£(j ance into armored and air forces stationed on its disp ^ borders with India, particularly Kashmir, and t u .^g U. S. assistance did not serve its purpose of 'ncr^sSist- regional stability. This was also true of the U. S- a£i7jn- ance President John F. Kennedy extended to India ^ ning in 1962, since much of this aid was directly °r „’s rectly used to build up India’s forces on PJ borders. This ill-planned U. S. assistance to Sout came to an abrupt end with the 1965 and 1971 In 0 stani wars. . nagain
The United States contemplated assisting Pakista ’ jpgd in both 1969 and 1975. In 1969, the Pakistanis President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State
68
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/ Jui.v
^singer establish secret communications with the Peo- Pe s Republic of China and, in return, small amounts of ?J*’tary assistance were released to Pakistan. In 1975, issinger again offered Pakistan assistance, this time in an e '0rt to coerce Pakistani President Zulkafir Ali Bhutto 'n|° not pursuing nuclear weapon development. Bhutto ^Jected Kissinger’s offer of A-7 attack planes, and U. S.- akistani relations deteriorated until 1981.
At this crucial juncture, in the wake of the fall of the hah of Iran and the subsequent loss of U. S. influence in an and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United tates reinstituted assistance to Pakistan. In the 1982 aid Package, as in its predecessors, naval aid was minimal and Pakistan’s request nearly all of the military portion of , e $4.2 billion aid package was in the form of air force hd army equipment. In 1988, the pattern was the same; w0st of the $290 million in U. S. military aid to Pakistan etlt to its air and ground forces.
c ^°day—Bhutto Replaces Zia: The August 1988 plane ash that took the life of Pakistan’s President, Mohamad Zia ul-Haq will influence both the scope and direction lj U. S.-Pakistani cooperation. Most importantly, the ^ h'ted States has lost the regional leader around which it Sloped its post-Shah Southwest Asian policy. Zia took
the l .
^ ead both in encouraging the West to aid the Afghani re Oadeen and in providing a conduit for that aid to lhe Tt 8uerr>llas. Furthermore, in his negotiations with hited States, Zia was effective in obtaining the maxi- rO aniount of U. S. assistance for Pakistan, including tegUern fighter aircraft. In return, Zia agreed to rein- prQate Pakistan into the U. S. mutual security program, a
aJram that most Pakistanis felt had failed them in 1965 °d 1971.
The emergence of Benazir Bhutto as leader of Pakistan can have several possible effects on relations with the United States. Clearly, U. S. ties with Zia were strong, and there is no guarantee that Bhutto will continue Zia’s strong commitment to the mutual security program. But the emergence of a civilian leader should not imply an automatic deterioration in relations with the United States simply because historically the U. S.-Pakistani friendship has fared better with military leaders. In fact, relations with General Zia were heading for a difficult period, primarily because of the impending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Once the Soviet withdrawal was complete, the U. S. need for Pakistan as a conduit for aid to the mujahadeen would be over, and the U. S. Congress was sure to begin raising questions about the viability of aiding a military leadership that seemed to be actively procuring a nuclear weapons capability, as General Zia appeared to be. Benazir Bhutto’s emergence will leave Congress much more willing to support military assistance to Pakistan should it continue to request it.
As for naval assistance, Zia’s departure—and that of the Pakistani Army’s Chief of Staff and nearly a dozen more senior army officials killed with the leader—has several interesting implications.
Because the Pakistani Army has lost its position of national leadership and complete dominance over the budgetary process, the United States has its first opportunity in many years to encourage Pakistan to develop a realistic naval force that could contribute significantly to regional stability in the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea. Naval assistance also would allow Bhutto to define a defense policy independent of Zia’s, but one that also would not drive the armed forces completely against her.
How to Modernize Pakistan’s Navy: Bhutto’s government must take many steps if it is to transform the Pakistani Navy into a viable regional presence. First, Pakistan needs to rebuild its fleet of seven small destroyers and frigates. Plans in the past three years to buy Type-21 and Type-23 frigates from the United Kingdom have fallen through, primarily because the navy could not obtain the hard cash needed to finance the deal.6 While the Pakistanis could channel some of the 1987 U. S. military aid program into purchasing these British frigates, it would be more desirable and fiscally responsible from the U. S. perspective to modernize and transfer to Pakistan 8 or 12 of its 16 Brooke (FFG-1) and Garcia (FF-1040)-class frigates that the U. S. Navy is now retiring.7 These U. S. frigates would represent a substantial improvement over Pakistan’s six World War II-vintage Gearing (DD-710)- class destroyers, which are incapable of being modernized to carry advanced weaponry. The newer ships would give Pakistan a mix of antisubmarine, antisurface, and antiair warfare capabilities and would be ideal platforms from which to protect sea-lanes. This ship transfer also would bring the Pakistani Navy into the U. S. logistical pipeline and create a source of U. S. naval stores in the region.
Toward this end, in early 1989, the United States leased to Pakistan four Brooke-class and four Garcia-class frig-
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*',ings / July 1989
ates that were to have been retired, along with a previously decommissioned support ship. In addition, Pakistan has procured two relatively inexpensive British Leander-class frigates, which are proven escort ships.8 The United States also should consider encouraging Pakistan to procure minesweeping vessels. When the United States first envisioned Pakistan and Iran as regional allies in the 1950s, the primary role that these countries’ navies were to play was mine warfare. To support these efforts, the United States sent several minesweepers to both these countries, but the large forces contemplated by U. S. planners were never delivered primarily because neither Iran nor Pakistan desired to play such a role. The difficulties that the United States encountered in delivering a sufficient minesweeping capability to the Persian Gulf in 1987 and the limited minesweeping forces available to the United States both point to the benefits of developing Pakistan’s mine warfare forces. From the Pakistanis’ viewpoint, the procurement of minesweeping vessels would allow them to strengthen their ties with their Arab friends who depend on clear sea lines of communication throughout the Gulf; and it would help them prevent India from blockading Pakistan’s ports with mines laid by their extensive submarine force. The transfer of U. S. ships should help establish more cooperation between personnel of the U. S. and Pakistani | navies specifically, as well as between U. S. and ot ^ regional naval personnel. Americans would be stationed Pakistan to train naval personnel and to act as technic assistants throughout these ships’ lives. Conversely, ?a stani naval officers would be posted to the United Sta for advanced schooling both at surface warfare send commands and war colleges. Such Pakistani Air fo training in the United States has improved interservice lations in the past. A ship transfer would also open door for significant U. S.-Pakistani naval exercises in 1 Gulf. . ■ Iso The modernization of Pakistan’s naval air arm is a necessary if Pakistan’s naval capabilities are to be V graded. Pakistan has two pressing needs: the P-3C U maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and the E-2C Haw early-warning aircraft. Several times during the past years, the Pakistanis have considered purchasing P" ^ through Australia, but lack of funds forced them to with the less capable French Atlantique aircraft. It1 stan procured the P-3C aircraft, combined allied air P° ^ in the area would increase, and the United States co further develop P-3 operations out of Pakistan. It has _ reported on several occasions that U. S. Navy P-3s °P ing out of Diego Garcia have made short stops in Pa 1 because of its proximity to their patrolling areas i .£ Arabian Sea. The acquisition of P-3Cs by Pakistan wo |
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The Pakistani Navy is moving in the right direction with its “new” ships: two British Leander-class frigates (above, the Shamsher) and nine U. S. ships (facing page, the former Brooke [FFG-1] and O’Callahan [FF-1051]). These latter transfers bring that navy into the U. S. logistical pipeline and create a potential source of U. S. naval stores in the region. | ■BftHftftftftftpift^-'’ I : . ; - also provide a logistical base for possible future >na ^ nance of U. S. P-3s in the area and would ena ^ jr United States to station additional military person Pakistan to help with upkeep of the Pakistani ^.*-jCjally It was recently announced that Pakistan has o ^ tC sought to purchase three U. S. P-3Cs as part of a P buy six of the aircraft. |98‘ „__ „»Hin£S / Ju ■' |
70
Proceedings
Jated port is within a day’s sailing of the Gulf and is one
^rations into the Gulf can be staged. The United States ,. s slowly stepped up its visits to the principal Pakistani
V&1 port of Karachi, including the 1987 visit of an air- lraft ,
carrier. A developed naval facility at Gwadar might
We))
The E-2C is another aircraft that the Pakistanis have rePortedly made overtures to the United States about purchasing The Pakistanis state they need the E-2C to patrol Te'r airspace adjoining Afghanistan; most analysts be- leve Pakistan also desires it to safeguard against an Indian a,r attack. But the United States could benefit from Pakistani E-2Cs because used in conjunction with Saudi Ara-
(.Jan Air Force units, the Hawkeyes could carry out many ^ *he responsibilities currently served by U. S. carrier- ^tsed aircraft, thus reducing the need for the long-term ePloyment of a U. S. carrier in the Arabian Sea. ' q finally, Pakistan should develop its western port of Wadar into an operational naval base. This strategically
\ offer the United States a friendly port close to the rait of Hormuz with the potential for developing sizeable Vort facilities.
s«eyond the inherent military advantages the United es would gain from providing a naval assistance pro- |» ,ni for Pakistan, it also could cull political benefits.
'Stan has cooperated militarily with Arab states in the ^ 20 years, the most important example of which has 5 etl the maintenan.ce of two Pakistani Army Battalions in 5^. oi Arabia to train troops and protect the Saudi leader- Iw ^auc*' Arabia is the United States’s closest Arab ally, § lng had military ties with the superpower since 1943. ] O' Arabia, along with the United States, is Pakistan’s benefactor, so it would certainly view U. S. assist- f0 ® ln the development of a stable security environment (je "histan favorably. A naval focus to Pakistani military $ j °.Pment would be especially appreciated by the ity-S ’ wf|° have been unable to develop a naval capabil- ln the Gulf equal to their air and ground capabilities. e Rawing together of the U. S.-Saudi-Pakistani triangle
would go a long way toward comforting Arab fears about any lack in the depth in the U. S. commitment to regional security.
This naval aid plan would also help maintain the U. S. military assistance pipeline open to Pakistan despite the February 1989 Soviet departure from Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was the key that reopened the U. S. aid purse strings for Pakistan in 1982, and a reduction in the level of U. S. assistance to the Afghan guerrillas and a lessening of the Soviet threat to Southwest Asia could easily lead to a decrease in U. S. aid to Pakistan. The development of a new goal in U. S.- Pakistani military cooperation, albeit a naval one, would allow the Pakistanis to continue to receive all forms of military assistance. For Pakistan, such assistance is vital. Pakistan is surrounded by the unstable, war-tom countries of Iran and Afghanistan, and it still has long-standing border and ethnic disputes with India. This is not a time to lose its source of high-performance weaponry. Internally, Pakistan must also continue to maintain a heavy hand against its well-armed, historically autonomous frontier peoples. During the eight years of Afghanistan’s civil war these frontiersmen have become heavily armed, and have been agitated by the Afghan authorities to rebel.
A cutoff of U. S. aid to Pakistan is equally undesirable for the United States because it might be seen as another example of the United States letting down a country that had grown dependent for its security. The United States can ill afford to project this image in Southwest Asia, or any other area for that matter.
But the United States must not base a naval assistance program for Pakistan solely on weapons transfers. This type of mistake led to a collapse in the U. S. relationship with Pakistan in the early 1960s and has plagued many other U. S. mutual security programs. The United States must form joint regional planning with Pakistan for the deployment of maritime forces, and both countries must aggressively pursue and develop joint exercise and training programs. Much of the reason for the failure of the relationship with Pakistan in 1965 was the U. S. unwillingness to guarantee Pakistan’s security against an Indian attack, and Pakistan’s continued fears that the United States would someday suspend military assistance without just cause. These problems must be overcome if any assistance to Pakistan is to be meaningful. Pakistan should be able to expect the United States to support its legitimate defense needs, in light of the dangerous roles Pakistan has played to support U. S. policy against the Soviet Union, both in helping the mujahadeen in Afghanistan, and in the 1950s when U-2s (including Gary Powers’s ill-fated flight) flew out of Pakistani airfields.
The naval aid package, as a new U. S. military assistance program, would strengthen U. S. ties with the new civilian leadership in Islamabad, and confirm the continued U. S. commitment to post-Zia Pakistan. Furthermore, this package could test Benazir Bhutto’s commitment to continuing regional security cooperation with the United States and her ability to exert control over the Pakistani Army, which surely would find fault with a maritime- oriented assistance program.
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,nSS / July 1989
Potential Problems: Despite the many benefits this proposal offers U. S. policymakers, there are several specific problems with this naval assistance package, both for Pakistan and the United States.
Within the United States two principal factors work against a potential naval aid package to Pakistan. First is the pro-India lobby in Congress, which views India, rather than Pakistan, as the country that the United States should support in South Asia. The pro-India lobby in Congress has twice proved its effectiveness. During the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflicts it successfully argued for a U. S. embargo on military goods destined for Pakistan and India. Both times these embargos tilted the balance of power to India, which continued to receive military supplies from the Soviet Union, while Pakistan, which had
neighboring Afghanistan. Fortunately for Pakistan, ^ U. S. policymakers assigned a high priority to estajeen- ing a supply line through Pakistan to aid the mujaha £ Thus military aid to Pakistan “for security agains y Soviet threat” was permitted. Almost all U. S. n1' assistance in the 1982 aid package was earmarked r velop Pakistani army and air units to protect the K ,-j (0 Pass region on the Pakistani-Afghan border. Nava jet Pakistan was difficult to justify in the context of the ^ Qf threat, since the closest Soviet home port is thousa ^ miles away. Naval aid would be seen primarily as a^ lenge to the Indian Navy’s regional dominance a g. pro-India lobby would almost certainly oppose tins posed assistance to Pakistan. (S in
Another dilemma that the United States confro^^ aiding Pakistan is the latter’s desire to obtain a n arsenal to match India’s. Although the Pakistani
Proceedings
■ *P has tactfully remained silent about its nuclear desires ^ *he years it has received U. S. aid, it is widely known to ^ Pursuing, and may have already achieved, membership n lhe nuclear club. Assistance to a country pursuing a Uclear weapon capability is strictly forbidden by the 1975 ^yniington Amendment. It has been a constant irritant to ■ S.-Pakistani relations that a waiver to the Symington uiendment is needed every few years to allow continued ' to Pakistan. The irony for Pakistan is that the United ates did little to dissuade either India or Israel from ob- d(Jn,ng such nuclear weaponry (as it appears they have p jte), and that these are the two countries from which 'Stan fears it must deter a nuclear threat. n spite of these problems, the United States has been supply Pakistan with a wide range of new weap-
to
tiK^ U1 recent years: F-16 fighter planes for its air force, e'launched, optically tracked, wire-command (TOW) ."ank missiles for the army, and all the armament reft ,'red to modernize an armored division.10 While the %sta
aid c°nt:
■tarn Army and Air Force have benefited from such and continue to develop as potent forces, the navy has
lnued to lag behind and can be termed at best a Third p force. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that U lstan’s other major arms supplier, the People’s Repubs. China, cannot provide the maritime weaponry Paki- n "eeds. As a result, aid for naval development lies n e y in the hands of the United States. But even if the sta • ^tatcs recognizes the necessity of aiding the Paki- Navy and attempts to pursue such a policy, Pakistan 7 resist. '
It is:
and have aborted their various naval development programs in favor of their army and air force.
Conclusion: While these problems cannot simply be brushed aside, they will not prevent the United States from implementing a determined naval assistance program for Pakistan if it so chooses. Neither of the U. S. stumbling blocks derailed the 1982 or 1987 aid programs. And as the U. S. involvement in the Persian Gulf continues to cost dollars and lives, these smaller political questions will have less influence on policy. Although the Pakistani Army and Air Force elite may not exactly desire a program of naval assistance, if it is the only military aid package available from the United States, it could have some allure.
Now seems an appropriate time for the United States to examine its role in the Persian Gulf region and to look for new ways in which it can defend its interests. Rather than fall into its common post-World War II role as provider of both arms and men for the defense of other nations until it tires of the obligation or the recipient nations tire of the U. S. presence, the United States has the opportunity to develop a regional approach to Southwest Asian security. Current U. S. policy calls for Pakistan to contribute to U. S. “efforts to prevent further expansion of Soviet influence in South and Southwest Asia” and, among other objectives, “to contribute military personnel to security efforts in the Persian Gulf region.”11 The United States should use this policy as a foundation to help Pakistan become a naval partner in the Gulf.
jna fair slice of the U. S. military assistance packages and 1982: the navy is and always has been the
l sister of the Pakistani military forces. The air force
f- - J
I°ught well in the wars with India and proved instru-
- 6,ltal in deterring any Indian (or Soviet) threats to Paki- As such, the air force is well received by the Paki- airc* PU^I'C> and the procurement of top-flight fighter 9sraft is a national concern. The army, while perhaps not |Uccessful on the battlefield as the air force, has ensured , ‘°n’s share of the defense budget by retaining the polit- Vea Cadership of Pakistan for nearly 25 of Pakistan’s 42 ij, rs °f independence. Although the Pakistani govern- Vse ^3S severaI times requested large naval aid packages,
is
^t of the Pakistani request.
0rnPlicating the internal problems of the Pakistani tre ^ ls its weakness relative to its Indian rival. With a $0endous amount of arms sales and assistance from the all m ^n'on> India has built a navy that is stronger than ach'fle °tl'er Indian Ocean navies combined and has 'he TVed Par'ty with superpower naval forces in place in e"d] n^'an Ocean. Indian naval growth has a seemingly <triTiess Potential, because the country has a willing set of sire • SuPPl'ers 'n the Soviet Union and Britain, and a de- 1^-home eventually to push the superpowers out of the a,n Ocean altogether. In deference to this clear Indian rq0cj supremacy, the Pakistanis have decided that the er"ization of their navy is not economically expedient
s'an
s'ani
its i
s'an'! ltems are nearly always the first deleted by the Rakish Us themselves when the U. S. assistance offered falls
'The Saudi Air Force is a formidable one, with three F-15 squadrons, more than 50 British Tornado fighter bombers, and five airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. See IISS, The Military Balance, London 1986.
2The Saudi Navy is only 3,000 men strong. Saudi Arabia only has a population base of about 11 million people. The manning of both a modem navy and air force would seem to be prohibitive.
India’s regional objectives and the superpowers’ negotiations concerning the Indian Ocean are discussed in Bieter Braun’s The Indian Ocean (London: C. Hurst Co., 1983).
4The U-2 base and Pakistan’s role in CENTO are well documented. One discussion is in Sharin Tahir-Kheli’s The United States and Pakistan, (Praeger Publishing, 1982). Pakistan’s role in CENTO was laid out in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff files of Admiral Arthur W. Radford and General Nathan F. Twining at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
5Thc Pakistani Navy received from 5 to 15% of military assistance annually between 1958 and 1963. See the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia files at the National Archives.
Pakistan’s aborted attempts to purchase British Type-21 frigates in 1986 and Type- 23 frigates in 1987 are detailed in Michael Vlahos’s “Middle East, North African and South Asian Navies,’’ U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1988, pp. 58-66.
7The Brooke class has a Mk-22 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launcher, an SH-2 helicopter; ASROC launcher, and shipboard torpedoes for antisubmarine warfare capabilities; and a five-inch gun. The Garcia class has an additional five-inch gun in place of the SAM launcher.
8Michael Vlahos, “Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian Navies,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1989, p. 150.
9Ibid.
10Indian naval strength is also detailed in IISS, The Military Balance.
1‘Assistance to Pakistan is outlined and justified in “Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs,” fiscal year 1988, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1987.
Lieutenant Montgomery has recently completed Nuclear Power Training at the New York Prototype and is transferring to Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport, Rhode Island.
Vdi
'"gs / July 1989
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