The U.S. Naval Academy seems to have become a feeding zone for the press, for virtually every incident—minor or major—has made its way to the front page of The Washington Post. Why is this happening? The issues are complex; nevertheless, the Naval Academy too often has placed itself at the center of plots that run contrary to the goals and traditions of the institution. Sexual misconduct, harassment, cheating, and run-ins with the law do little to uphold the traditionally superb reputation of the Naval Academy.
Fortunately, the current leadership at the Academy is fighting this drift aggressively by demanding rigorous adherence to the essentials of military discipline and absolute responsibility for one’s own actions. Sadly, there is still a lot of luster to restore to the Academy’s once-shining reputation, and the turnaround may take some time.
Have the headline-grabbing scandals simply been isolated incidents caused by a few bad apples, or are they symptomatic of a fundamental flaw in the path Annapolis had chosen in the past decade? Before the current reform efforts, the Naval Academy diverted too much attention from the primary goal of developing the most effective leaders for our seagoing fighting forces, and tried too hard to conform to sociopolitical trends in society. The fact is that the U.S. armed forces do not operate under the same laws as the rest of the country, and what might seem unfair to the ordinary citizen is in no way unfair to those who chose to serve in uniform. Military discipline demands tighter rules and higher standards.
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress “to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” By enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950, Congress prescribed both the substantive and the procedural law governing the justice and administration of the armed forces. What does this mean to those entering the Naval Academy? It means that their rights as individuals are constrained in comparison to their civilian counterparts. Indeed, the Academy’s slow drift away from its traditional structure and discipline now is centered in Admiral Larson’s crosshairs. (See “The Next 150 Years Begin,” pp. 65-69, September 1996 Proceedings.) In one of his first steps as Superintendent, Admiral Larson ordered a reduction in “certain privileges to restore some of the military structure and discipline within the Brigade.”
Why is tighter discipline required at service academies? Because certain military offenses that do not constitute wrongdoing in the civilian world are vital to governing the actions of military personnel. Telling off the boss or missing work, or even an appointment, might reflect poorly on a performance report or even cost a job, but will not send a civilian to jail. Nevertheless, such misconduct, in a combat environment, can undermine the effectiveness of the fighting force and get people killed. In the military, misconduct, whether performance or character related. must be dealt with swiftly. There is absolutely no need to package disciplinary action for public approval. Discipline is essential in the military, and the manner in which it is enforced is necessarily harsher and more unbending than in civilian society. And so it must be at the Naval Academy.
When individuals or classes cross the line of acceptable personal or professional conduct, the consequences should be swift and certain. No caucuses are required and the public does not have to approve. The Naval Academy has a right—and the responsibility—to act within the bounds of the UCMJ and is not required to justify any action against an individual or group as long as those actions are within the laws that govern military justice and its administration in the armed forces.
Navy and Marine Corps operations can create high levels of stress in our officers. Young officers must have the strongly ingrained ability to perform under such pressures, whether they come from impending action or a screaming superior. Officers must have the ability to filter out the substance from the noise, then proceed in a professional and effective manner. To shelter midshipmen from the fleet’s realities, by removing from their training any aspects that might be considered indignities, is unrealistic and does officer candidates a disservice in preparing them for the rigors of military life. This does not mean that an upperclassman should be able to punch a plebe for a misstep; however, rules defining “hazing” for the Class of 1997 seem to have defined behavior commonly found in the fleet as an offense that would call for separation. Specifically; "Hazing is defined as any unauthorized assumption of authority by a midshipman whereby another midshipman suffers of is exposed to any cruelty, indignity, humiliation, hardship, or oppression, or the abridgment of any right.”
The Naval Academy is not boot camp—nor is it summer camp. Training should be designed solely to best prepare future officers for what they will encounter after graduation.
Lieutenant Commander Ricketts graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1983. He served eight years on active duty, including tours on board the Caron (DD-970), the Ticonderoga (CG-47), and the Philippine Sea (CG-58).